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The present state of the law is unsatisfactory. The exact effect on the marriage of the parties has not been decided although in English law if artificial insemination by donor (AID) takes place without consent that would appear to be a ground for divorce since I969. The law regards a child born as a result of AID as illegitimate and draws no distinction between the case where the husband consents and where he does not. Theoretically, an offence is committed if the birth entry is falsified, presumably in cases where the husband consents. The AID child, like any other-illegitimate child, has rights against the natural parents, but he is in a worse position than most illegitimate children, in that he may not have any information about his father.
It is now possible to freeze sperm and so preserve it over longer periods. All only cruelty alleged has involved the sexual activities of the parties, but in a recent case (I966) an act of gross indecency by the husband was held to have struck at the root of the matrimonial relationship and it was proved that the conduct affected the wife's health. Artificial insemination by donor without consent, it is submitted, strikes more forcibly at the root, and, if it affected the husband's health, the court would possibly find that the wife had been guilty of cruelty.
Where AID takes place with the husband's consent, he would be barred from founding on this in any divorce action in which he sought to use that AD as the ground. In Scots law, it would be regarded as either connivance will be alimented and educated in the same way as a legitimate child would have been and the husband will probably take steps to secure that it is given succession rights in his estate. It is unlikely, though not impossible, that the court will require to consider that child's position as an AID child which is accepted as one of the family. The Matrimonial Proceedings (Children) Act 1958 gives the court power to deal with the custody, maintenance, and education of a child which has been accepted as one of the family, and before decree is granted in an action of divorce, nullity, or separation, the Court must be satisfied that satisfactory arrangements have been made for the child's upbringing. The Feversham Committee suggested in paragraph 159 that a child born as a result of MD to which the husband consents should be given by statute the same rights to aliment as an adopted child which in turn are the same as those of a legitimate child (Adoption Act 1958). The writer doubts whether rights of aliment and rights of succession can be or should be treated differently. If they were so considered, the child would be treated in exactly the same way as a legitimate child until the husband died, and then he could be excluded from succession to his estate. The position in relation to succession in the wife's estate is slightly different in that the illegitimate child has an equal right with legitimate children to the estate of an intestate (I968, 1969) . If the same rights of aliment and succession were granted to the child, as are presently available to adopted children, that would confer on the child the same status as the adopted child. That situation would differ completely from other acquisitions of status, the conferring of which is done by some legally recognized process, eg, the adoption petition. An Act of Parliament might confer the status, but it would only do so if it could be proved that the MD was done with consent and the proof to that consent would still be required. This might be difficult, particularly after the husband's death, and so it is suggested that this is not the correct approach. The only solution which is satisfactory is to have a new status of 'accepted' child, but even that is not free from difficulty.
However, where the child is born as a result of AID to which the husband has not consented, it is less likely that he would accept the child and he might refuse to aliment it. Indeed the husband might leave the marital home, or in Englnd seek a divorce, the result of which could be that the child could be in a difficult financial position with only his mother to look to for support unless he could ascertain the identity of the donor, assuming that he even knows the ciucumstances of his birth. Certainly if the child could establish the identity of the donor, he would be entitled to support from him as his illegitimate child. The writer understands that before semen is given the donor signs a document to the effect that the seed is given on condition that his name is not revealed. That condition governs only the donor/practitioner relationship and the practitioner/recipient relationship, but does not affect the child, but the writer is of the opinion that there is no legal process in Scotland or England whereby the child could ascertain the name of the donor. The existence of a special statutory remedy for the adopted child would seem to bear this out (Adoption Act I958). However, the child's status might have to be proved in succession claims and rights of aliment on divorce. Does it follow that the donor's identity would be revealed? In the case of MacLennan (I958), Lord Wheatley criticized the lack of specification in the wife's pleadings. 'Having admitted the long period of non access, the birth of a child, all that the defender states by way of pleading is that the child was conceived as a result of artificial insemination by a donor. Such a bald assertion offends against all the canons of specification and fair notice and it was recognized by her counsel that, unless much fuller specification was given in relation to the time, place and circumstances of the alleged artificial impregnation of the defender, the attack on the relevancy of the defence would have to be sustained.. .'. Obviously in his view the wife would have had to put more detail into her pleadings and thereafter lead evidence. In the end of the day she decided not to, but had she done so it seems inevitable that the name of the practitioner would be revealed. This would raise questions of secrecy and the Hippocratic Oath. It is not therefore possible to say that the discharge signed by the donor is an effective bar to all future inquiry. Indeed, Lord Wheatley gave some guidance on what additional material the wife would have had to put in her pleadings when he spoke of 'much fuller specification ... in relation to the time, place and circumstances of the alleged impregnation.. .'. He did not go so far as to say that he would require the donor's name to be revealed, but neither did he explain what he meant by the word 'circumstances'. This area of difficulty and others only arise if the AID child is regarded as illegitimate. This view was also taken in Illinois in Doornbos v. Doornbos and presumably would be taken also in Italy (Battaglini, I96I) , where it is a criminal offence. However, some states in the United States regard an AID child, whose conception was consented to by the husband in writing, as a legitimate child.
